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Following the crowd is usually dismissed as mindless acquiescence, devoid of original 15 
thought and authenticity. Despite this seemingly undesirable predicate, in human 16 
interactions, majority influences seem pervasive, even beyond conscious control 17 
(Sweeny & Whitney 2014). The influence of majorities on individuals’ learning and 18 
decision-making has therefore received ample attention in the scientific community. In 19 
particular, psychologists and cultural evolutionists have been intrigued: the former 20 
group of scholars aiming at understanding the workings of specific social influences 21 
(Asch 1956; Sherif 1936), the latter interested in exploring evolutionarily stable 22 
strategies explaining the emergence and persistence of cultural diversity (Boyd & 23 
Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981). These focused investigations have 24 
led to some seminal findings, for instance the robust fact that, in certain contexts, 25 
roughly a third of human adults adopt an erroneous majority stance against their better 26 
knowledge (Asch 1956; Bond & Smith 1996) and the fact that preferentially adopting 27 
the majority strategy can yield culture-like phenomena (i.e., relatively high level of 28 
  
within-group behavioural homogeneity) under a wide range of conditions (Boyd & 29 
Richerson 1985; Henrich & Boyd 1998; Richerson & Boyd 2005). 30 
 31 
 Despite subtle differences of approach or interpretation (Morgan & Laland 32 
2012; van Leeuwen & Haun 2014), psychologists and cultural evolutionists have in 33 
principle all adhered to conformity’s definitional aspect of adopting the preferred 34 
strategy of the majority of group members rather than simply the strategy observed most 35 
frequently. Besides the benefits of trans-disciplinary definitional consistency, there is 36 
another reason for this particular adherence, which can be succinctly summarized by 37 
appealing to: “the wisdom of the crowd”. Mathematical and empirical analysis show 38 
that large groups of individuals are better equipped to find correct answers to challenges 39 
than relatively small groups, a phenomenon that is also referred to as “collective 40 
cognition” (Hastie & Kameda 2005; King & Cowlishaw 2007; Wolf et al. 2013) (note 41 
that “the majority” by definition constitutes the largest sub-group in a population). 42 
Intuitively, this finding can be understood by acknowledging that the majority strategy 43 
is the strategy that most group members, with their unique sets of learning skills, have 44 
converged upon. As such, the majority strategy represents a robust synergy of 45 
individual capacities for discovering useful contingencies, which speaks to the adaptive 46 
potential of majority influences. 47 
 48 
 Within this definition of copying the majority of group members, cultural 49 
evolutionists study the disproportionate tendency of naïve individuals to adopt the 50 
majority strategy (originally coined “conformist transmission”, see Boyd & Richerson 51 
1985). In contrast, psychologists focus on individuals’ tendencies to forgo their 52 
personal strategy and adopt the conflicting majority variant (originally coined 53 
“conformity”, see Asch 1956). By now, a plethora of studies have evidenced conformity 54 
  
in both human children (Corriveau & Harris 2010; Haun & Tomasello 2011) and adults 55 
(Asch 1956; Bond 2005) and some evidence for conformist transmission in human 56 
adults exists as well (Coultas 2004; Jacobs & Campbell 1961; Morgan et al. 2011). 57 
Recently, scholars have similarly started to explore majority influences in non-human 58 
animals, either for reasons of understanding species-specific learning patterns (Aplin et 59 
al. 2014), or aiming at reconstructing the evolutionary path that led to the conformity 60 
observed in humans (Whiten, Horner & de Waal 2005). While this endeavour is to be 61 
applauded, crucial mismatches between the original majority influence constructs and 62 
the recent non-human animal studies significantly hamper our insights. By focusing on 63 
the most recent non-human animal study in this area (Aplin et al. 2014), we wish to 64 
clarify the study of majority biased learning so that both species-specific behaviour and 65 
the evolutionary trajectory of (human) tendencies can be more validly assessed. 66 
 67 
 Aplin and colleagues claim an emergence and persistence of behavioural 68 
traditions via conformist transmission and conformity in wild great tits (Aplin et al. 69 
2014). After training one individual in each of several sub-populations to obtain a 70 
reward from an automated food dispenser by sliding a small door either to the left or to 71 
the right, the researchers were able to observe how entire sub-populations converged on 72 
the same door-sliding technique. Yet, while their evidence regarding the emergence and 73 
persistence of great tit traditions (i.e., group-specific behavioural variants) seems robust, 74 
and represents an admirable contribution to the limited literature on traditions in wild 75 
animals, their pivotal claim of demonstrating culture via conformist transmission and 76 
conformity is seemingly misguided, as we will argue below. 77 
 78 
 First and foremost, where Aplin et al. report that great tits consider the majority 79 
when learning socially, they operationalized the majority strategy as the strategy that is 80 
  
“performed most frequently” (Aplin et al. 2014). As explained above, however, in terms 81 
of both cultural evolution and the study of psychology, the meaningful 82 
operationalization is the strategy that is “performed by most individuals”. Sometimes 83 
these two definitions will capture the same thing, but – crucially – sometimes they will 84 
not. If, for instance, individual A performs Strategy 1 six times and individuals B, C, D, 85 
and E perform Strategy 2 one time each, under Aplin et al.’s account (Aplin et al. 2014), 86 
Strategy 1 is the majority strategy, while – to the best of our knowledge – in terms of all 87 
studies
 
on cultural evolution, Strategy 2 would be considered the majority strategy. Note 88 
that the aforementioned synergy of individuals’ learning capacities (collective cognition 89 
- represented by the majority strategy) does not apply to behavioural repetitions by one 90 
individual (in this example: individual A). Hence, this critique is not just a plea for 91 
definitional consistency: (mathematical) logic and empirical work actually indicates the 92 
central role of individuals in majority influences, not mere frequencies of behaviour 93 
patterns (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Hastie & Kameda 2005; King & Cowlishaw 2007; 94 
Wolf et al. 2013). Confusion over individuals versus frequencies may, in part, arise 95 
because modelling studies often use a conformist transmission function expressed in 96 
terms of frequencies, but derived from the number of individuals in a population 97 
(Walters & Kendal 2013). A recent empirical study even shows that the effects of 98 
individuals and frequencies can be teased apart experimentally, with the evidenced 99 
differences in behavioural outcomes corroboratively indicating the necessity to refrain 100 
from confounding individuals and frequencies (Haun et al. 2013). 101 
 102 
 One way in which Aplin et al. claim the majority influenced the birds’ behaviour 103 
is through conformist transmission (Aplin et al. 2014). Recapitulating, conformist 104 
transmission is adaptive because it represents collective cognition: it allows a learner to 105 
integrate the output of multiple individuals’ social and individual learning experiences 106 
  
(Boyd & Richerson 1985; Richerson & Boyd 2005). Under Aplin et al.’s 107 
operationalization of the majority, however, this advantage may not have been present 108 
(Aplin et al. 2014). Minimally, we must know how many other birds were actually 109 
observed by the learners (including their relative strategy preferences), yet these details 110 
are not provided (Aplin et al. 2014). If Aplin et al. were able to re-analyse their data 111 
such that each individual could be scrutinized in light of their unique individual-based 112 
observation records (e.g., individual A observes three conspecifics using Strategy 1 and 113 
nine conspecifics using Strategy 2), a valid investigation of conformist transmission 114 
would be possible by comparing the majority sizes they observed (in this example: 115 
75%) to their likelihood of adopting the majority strategy (in this example: Strategy 2). 116 
Note further that while conformist transmission can result in tradition formation (Boyd 117 
& Richerson 1995; Henrich & Boyd 1998), the fact that Aplin et al. (Aplin et al. 2014) 118 
found that birds formed traditions does not in itself evidence conformist transmission. 119 
Traditions may arise and stabilize due to many different transmission biases, not just 120 
conformist transmission (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Haun, van Leeuwen & Edelson 121 
2013; Kendal, Coolen & Laland 2009). 122 
 123 
 Aplin et al. furthermore claim that the majority continued to influence the birds, 124 
even after they had acquired a working strategy. Two cases are reported as evidence for 125 
their majority influence interpretation, i) of the birds that used both foraging solutions 126 
(n=78), 8 birds gradually switched from using the non-seeded variant to the seeded 127 
variant, and ii) 10 out of 14 birds switched their strategy preference when immigrating 128 
into groups where the alternative solution had been seeded to match the new groups’ 129 
preference (Aplin et al. 2014). Aplin et al. interpret these cases as evidence for ‘social 130 
conformity’ (or conformity), a term that refers to forgoing preferred behaviour in order 131 
to match the majority of individuals (see above; Asch 1956). Aplin et al.’s study (Aplin 132 
  
et al. 2014), however, does not provide sufficient evidence for conformity because, as 133 
previously outlined, i) frequencies do not necessarily equal individuals, and ii) it is 134 
unknown what the birds observed before switching their preferences. In other words, in 135 
the cases where information was available on how many times the two foraging 136 
solutions were observed by the respective birds, there is no information presented on 137 
across how many individuals these occurrences were distributed, and in the cases where 138 
only the relative strategy preferences are reported, the observation records of the 139 
respective birds remain entirely opaque. Hence, interpretation in terms of majority 140 
influence (here, conformity) seems premature. Indeed, a likely alternative explanation 141 
for the outlined behavioural patterns is that the great tits employed a learning strategy in 142 
which social information was always preferred over individual information, perhaps 143 
especially when this social information was the most recently acquired piece of 144 
information. For instance, the first ‘conformity’ case reported by Aplin et al. (preference 145 
switch within populations; see above) could be explained by the respective birds 146 
individually learning the non-seeded foraging solution followed by subsequent social 147 
learning of the seeded solution. In a similar vein, the second ‘conformity’ case reported 148 
by Aplin et al. (preference switch after immigrating into a new population; see above) 149 
could be explained by immigrant birds updating their foraging strategies by copying the 150 
behaviour of locally attuned conspecifics, for instance based on a ‘copy when uncertain’ 151 
bias, since the respective birds had entered a new group/environment. Crucially, such 152 
cases of (biased) social learning do not automatically allow for interpretation of the 153 
respective behavioural patterns in terms of majority influences: while social influences 154 
comprise many different mechanisms and biases, majority influence can only be 155 
demonstrated by providing evidence of the behavioural influence being caused by the 156 
majority of group members (van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). 157 
 158 
  
 In general, within-group behavioural convergence can come about in many 159 
different ways and should not be taken as evidence for majority influences without 160 
closer scrutiny, not even when individuals explore alternatives and re-converge on their 161 
first learned solution (see van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013 & van Leeuwen et al. 2013 in 162 
response to e.g., Dindo et al. 2009; Hopper et al. 2011; Whiten et al. 2005). Not only 163 
individual learning proclivities (e.g., “habit formation”, see Pesendorfer et al. 2009), but 164 
also social learning tendencies other than majority influences must be ruled out before 165 
(re-)convergence patterns can be interpreted in terms of majority influences (van 166 
Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). Another illustrative case of premature majority-influence 167 
conclusions is present in a recent wild vervet monkey study by van de Waal and 168 
colleagues (van de Waal, Borgeaud & Whiten 2013). In this study, immigrating male 169 
vervet monkeys adjusted their food colour preference (e.g., pink) to the food colour 170 
preference of the new group (e.g., blue). This preference-switch was interpreted in 171 
terms of conformity, yet it was unknown what and whom the immigrating males had 172 
observed prior to their preference switching (van de Waal et al. 2013). In both the great 173 
tit and vervet monkey cases, therefore, we wish to stress that the identification of 174 
transmission biases (e.g., copy dominant individuals, copy when uncertain, copy the 175 
majority) requires robust measurement of individual’s observation records (e.g., see van 176 
Leeuwen et al. 2013; Kendal et al. 2015). Thus, potentially premature conclusions – in 177 
the absence of supporting evidence regarding who observed whom perform which 178 
strategy – will only hamper the empirical study of transmission biases. 179 
 180 
 Recapitulating, we believe that, due to an invalid operationalization of “the 181 
majority”, and the absence of data on birds’ observation records, Aplin et al. (Aplin et 182 
al. 2014) cannot substantiate their conclusions that the great tit traditions emerged and 183 
stabilized due to the claimed majority-influenced learning – neither conformist 184 
  
transmission nor conformity has been sufficiently evidenced yet. More generally, with 185 
the aim to streamline the study of species-typical social learning behaviour (e.g. Laland 186 
2004) and the evolutionary trajectory of (human) cultural transmission tendencies, we 187 
wish to emphasize that the identification of conformist transmission and conformity 188 
necessitates scrutiny on the level of the majority of individuals. 189 
190 
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